Universität zu Köln

Bierbrauer, Felix ORCID: 0000-0003-3879-9607 (2014). Optimal Tax and Expenditure Policy with Aggregate Uncertainty. Am. Econ. J.-Microecon., 6 (1). S. 205 - 258. NASHVILLE: AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. ISSN 1945-7685

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Abstract

We study optimal income taxation and public-goods provision under the assumption that the cross-section distributions of productive abilities or public-goods preferences are not known a priori. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with similar interests. The analysis therefore incorporates a requirement of coalition-proofness. The main result is that increased public-goods provision is associated with a more distortionary and a more redistributive tax system. With a conventional Mirrleesian treatment, the level of public-goods provision is not related to how distortionary or redistributive the tax system is.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Bierbrauer, Felix UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-3879-9607 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-447151
DOI:	10.1257/mic.6.1.205
Journal or Publication Title:	Am. Econ. J.-Microecon.
Volume:	6
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 205 - 258
Date:	2014
Publisher:	AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
Place of Publication:	NASHVILLE
ISSN:	1945-7685
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professorship for Macroeconomic
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION; ROBUST MECHANISM DESIGN; PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION; LARGE NUMBERS; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; LARGE ECONOMIES; SELF-SELECTION; GOODS; COLLUSION; LAW Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/44715