Universität zu Köln

Gretschko, Vitali, Rasch, Alexander and Wambach, Achim (2014). On the strictly descending multi-unit auction. J. Math. Econ., 50. S. 79 - 86. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0304-4068

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

We analyze the bidding behavior in a strictly descending multi-unit auction where the price decreases continuously without going back to the initial start price once an object is sold. We prove that any equilibrium in the multi-unit descending auction is inefficient. We derive a symmetric equilibrium for general distribution functions as well as an arbitrary number of bidders and objects. Moreover, equilibrium bidding is characterized by a set of initial value problems. Our analysis thus generalizes previous results in the literature. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Gretschko, Vitali UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Rasch, Alexander UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Wambach, Achim UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-450767
DOI:	10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.10.009
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Math. Econ.
Volume:	50
Page Range:	S. 79 - 86
Date:	2014
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Place of Publication:	LAUSANNE
ISSN:	0304-4068
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language AIRLINE OVERBOOKING Multiple languages Economics; Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications; Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/45076