Universität zu Köln

Ockenfels, Axel and Werner, Peter (2014). Scale manipulation in dictator games. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 97. S. 138 - 143. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1879-1751

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Abstract

We let subjects estimate behavior and expectations of others before they play dictator games, and only vary the quantitative scales for their estimates. Our data show that this manipulation may significantly affect economic decisions: dictators who are presented a scale with a higher midpoint transfer on average more than dictators who are presented a scale with a lower midpoint. The effect is stronger and significant in a treatment where dictators are asked to guess the average transfer expected by the recipients, compared to a treatment where they are asked to guess average transfers. Our experiment suggests that scale manipulation can be used in laboratory social interaction to systematically affect specific beliefs and to study their causal effects on behavior. (C) 2013 Elsevier BM. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Ockenfels, Axel UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Werner, Peter UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-450895
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2013.11.002
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
Volume:	97
Page Range:	S. 138 - 143
Date:	2014
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1879-1751
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professur für Economics, Design and Behavior
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PUBLIC-GOODS EXPERIMENTS; SOCIAL INFORMATION; FIELD EXPERIMENT; PREFERENCES; BELIEFS; FREQUENCY; IMPACT; NORMS Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/45089