Universität zu Köln

Deutscher, Christian ORCID: 0000-0002-3714-3326, Frick, Bernd, Guertler, Oliver and Prinz, Joachim (2013). Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Empirical Evidence from the Soccer Pitch. Scand. J. Econ., 115 (4). S. 1138 - 1158. HOBOKEN: WILEY-BLACKWELL. ISSN 0347-0520

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Abstract

In this paper, we address the problem of sabotage in tournaments with heterogeneous contestants. In a first step, we develop a formal model, which yields the prediction that favorites exert higher productive effort, while underdogs are more tempted to engage in destructive actions (sabotage). This is because favorites have a higher return on productive effort and both types of effort are substitutes. In a second step, we use data from German professional soccer to test this prediction. In line with the model, we find that favorite teams win more tackles in a fair way, while underdog teams commit more fouls.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Deutscher, Christian UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-3714-3326 UNSPECIFIED Frick, Bernd UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Guertler, Oliver UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Prinz, Joachim UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-474964
DOI:	10.1111/sjoe.12036
Journal or Publication Title:	Scand. J. Econ.
Volume:	115
Number:	4
Page Range:	S. 1138 - 1158
Date:	2013
Publisher:	WILEY-BLACKWELL
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	0347-0520
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language INCENTIVES; SELECTION; FOOTBALL; MARKETS; ENGLISH; BIAS; JOB Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/47496