Universität zu Köln

Gürtler, Oliver ORCID: 0000-0001-7792-5325 and Kraekel, Matthias ORCID: 0000-0001-6051-9996 (2012). Dismissal Tournaments. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, 168 (4). 547 - 562. TUBINGEN: Mohr Siebeck. ISSN 0932-4569

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Abstract

We consider a dismissal tournament where the loser gets fired. Although the firm takes possible selection failures into account when choosing the optimal tournament design, the selection efficiency of a dismissal tournament is often rather low. This is because low-ability workers, possessing relatively poor outside options, have strong incentives to secure their jobs.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Gürtler, Oliver UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-7792-5325 UNSPECIFIED Kraekel, Matthias UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-6051-9996 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-477223
DOI:	10.1628/093245612804469827
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE
Volume:	168
Number:	4
Page Range:	547 - 562
Date:	2012
Publisher:	Mohr Siebeck
Place of Publication:	TUBINGEN
ISSN:	0932-4569
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship for Economics
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS; RISK-TAKING; SABOTAGE; CONTESTS; SELECTION; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; INFORMATION; EMPLOYMENT; PRINCIPAL; CONTRACTS English Economics English
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/47722