Universität zu Köln

Goldluecke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian (2012). Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts. Econ. Lett., 117 (2). S. 405 - 408. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

This paper analyzes in a relational contracting framework when a principal should fully delegate a task to a team of hired workers or only partially delegate the task and work herself in the team. It is shown that full delegation is more likely to be optimal under a less efficient monitoring technology, lower generated surplus, lower complementarity of efforts, or a larger team of workers. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Goldluecke, Susanne UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Kranz, Sebastian UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-480295
DOI:	10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019
Journal or Publication Title:	Econ. Lett.
Volume:	117
Number:	2
Page Range:	S. 405 - 408
Date:	2012
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Place of Publication:	LAUSANNE
ISSN:	0165-1765
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language MORAL HAZARD; JOB DESIGN; TEAMS Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/48029