Universität zu Köln

Hoppe, Eva I. and Kusterer, David J. (2011). Conflicting tasks and moral hazard: Theory and experimental evidence. Eur. Econ. Rev., 55 (8). S. 1094 - 1109. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 0014-2921

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

We study a multi-task principal-agent problem in which tasks can be in direct conflict with each other. In theory, it is difficult to induce a single agent to exert efforts in two conflicting tasks, because effort in one task decreases the success probability of the other task. We have conducted an experiment in which we find strong support for the relevance of this incentive problem. In the presence of conflict, subjects choose two efforts significantly less often when both tasks are assigned to a single agent than when there are two agents each in charge of one task. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Hoppe, Eva I. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Kusterer, David J. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-485013
DOI:	10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.005
Journal or Publication Title:	Eur. Econ. Rev.
Volume:	55
Number:	8
Page Range:	S. 1094 - 1109
Date:	2011
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	0014-2921
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language LIMITED-LIABILITY; MULTITASK AGENCY; INCENTIVES; HIDDEN; CONTRACTS; FAIRNESS; DESIGN; JOB Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/48501