Universität zu Köln

Rockenbach, Bettina ORCID: 0000-0003-2624-1964 and Milinski, Manfred (2011). To qualify as a social partner, humans hide severe punishment, although their observed cooperativeness is decisive. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A., 108 (45). S. 18307 - 18313. WASHINGTON: NATL ACAD SCIENCES. ISSN 0027-8424

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Abstract

Conflicts of interest between the community and its members are at the core of human social dilemmas. If observed selfishness has future costs, individuals may hide selfish acts but display altruistic ones, and peers aim at identifying the most selfish persons to avoid them as future social partners. An interaction involving hiding and seeking information may be inevitable. We staged an experimental social-dilemma game in which actors could pay to conceal information about their contribution, giving, and punishing decisions from an observer who selects her future social partners from the actors. The observer could pay to conceal her observation of the actors. We found sophisticated dynamic strategies on either side. Actors hide their severe punishment and low contributions but display high contributions. Observers select high contributors as social partners; remarkably, punishment behavior seems irrelevant for qualifying as a social partner. That actors nonetheless pay to conceal their severe punishment adds a further puzzle to the role of punishment in human social behavior. Competition between hiding and seeking information about social behavior may be even more relevant and elaborate in the real world but usually is hidden from our eyes.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Rockenbach, Bettina UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-2624-1964 UNSPECIFIED Milinski, Manfred UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-485487
DOI:	10.1073/pnas.1108996108
Journal or Publication Title:	Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.
Volume:	108
Number:	45
Page Range:	S. 18307 - 18313
Date:	2011
Publisher:	NATL ACAD SCIENCES
Place of Publication:	WASHINGTON
ISSN:	0027-8424
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship for Experimental and Behavioral Economics Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Reinhard Selten Institute
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PUBLIC-GOODS EXPERIMENTS; ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; REPUTATION; GAMES; CUES; GENEROSITY; EVOLUTION; BENEFITS Multiple languages Multidisciplinary Sciences Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/48548