Universität zu Köln

Faigle, U., Grabisch, M. and Heyne, M. (2010). Monge extensions of cooperation and communication structures. Eur. J. Oper. Res., 206 (1). S. 104 - 111. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 0377-2217

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Abstract

Cooperation structures without any a priori assumptions on the combinatorial structure of feasible coalitions are studied and a general theory for marginal values, cores and convexity is established. The theory is based on the notion of a Monge extension of a general characteristic function, which is equivalent to the Lovasz extension in the special situation of a classical cooperative game. It is shown that convexity of a cooperation structure is tantamount to the equality of the associated core and Weber set. Extending Myerson's graph model for game theoretic communication, general communication structures are introduced and it is shown that a notion of supermodularity exists for this class that characterizes convexity and properly extends Shapley's convexity model for classical cooperative games. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Faigle, U. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Grabisch, M. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Heyne, M. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-495451
DOI:	10.1016/j.ejor.2010.01.043
Journal or Publication Title:	Eur. J. Oper. Res.
Volume:	206
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 104 - 111
Date:	2010
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	0377-2217
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language SHAPLEY VALUE; GAMES; CONSTRAINTS; GEOMETRIES; CORE Multiple languages Management; Operations Research & Management Science Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/49545