Knowing Falsely: the Non-factive Project - Kölner UniversitätsPublikationsServer

Bricker, Adam Michael . Knowing Falsely: the Non-factive Project. Acta Anal.-Int. Period. Philos. A.. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1874-6349

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DOI:10.1007/s12136-021-00471-3

Abstract

Quite likely the most sacrosanct principle in epistemology, it is near-universally accepted that knowledge is factive: knowing that p entails p. Recently, however, Bricker, Buckwalter, and Turri have all argued that we can and often do know approximations that are strictly speaking false. My goal with this paper is to advance this nascent non-factive project in two key ways. First, I provide a critical review of these recent arguments against the factivity of knowledge, allowing us to observe that elements of these arguments mutually reinforce respective weaknesses, thereby offering the non-factive project a much stronger foundation than when these arguments were isolated. Next, I argue tentatively in favor of Bricker's truthlikeness framework over the representational adequacy account favored by Buckwalter and Turri. Taken together, while none of this constitutes a knock-down argument against factivity, it does allow us to quiet some of the more immediate worries surrounding the non-factive project.

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Journal Article

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