Universität zu Köln

Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: 0000-0002-5011-0828 and Ockenfels, Axel ORCID: 0000-0003-1456-0191 (2021). Focusing climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment can promote cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A., 118 (11). WASHINGTON: NATL ACAD SCIENCES. ISSN 1091-6490

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Abstract

International cooperation on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, disarmament, or free trade needs to be negotiated. The success of such negotiations depends on how they are designed. In the context of international climate change policy, it has been proposed [e.g., M. L. Weitzman J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 1, 29-49 (2014)] that shifting the negotiation focus to a uniform common commitment (such as a uniform minimum carbon price) would lead to more ambitious cooperation. Yet, a proof-of-concept for this important claim is lacking. Based on game theoretical analyses, we present experimental evidence that strongly supports this conjecture. In our study, human subjects negotiate contributions to a public good. Subjects differ in their benefits and costs of cooperation. Participation in the negotiations and all commitments are voluntary. We consider treatments in which agreements are enforceable, and treatments in which they have to be self-enforcing. In both situations, negotiating a uniform common commitment is more successful in promoting cooperation than negotiating individual commitments (as in the Paris Agreement) and complex common commitments that tailor the commitment to the specific situation of each party (as attempted with the Kyoto Protocol). Furthermore, as suggested by our model, a uniform common commitment benefits most from being enforced.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Schmidt, Klaus M. UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 UNSPECIFIED Ockenfels, Axel UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-1456-0191 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-584005
DOI:	10.1073/pnas.2013070118
Journal or Publication Title:	Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.
Volume:	118
Number:	11
Date:	2021
Publisher:	NATL ACAD SCIENCES
Place of Publication:	WASHINGTON
ISSN:	1091-6490
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship 1 for Economics
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PUBLIC-GOODS; CARBON; PUNISHMENT; PROVISION; COST Multiple languages Multidisciplinary Sciences Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/58400