Universität zu Köln

Jann, Ole ORCID: 0000-0002-6198-3819 and Schottmüller, Christoph ORCID: 0000-0001-6059-1090 (2021). Regime change games with an active defender. Games Econ. Behav., 129. S. 96 - 114. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

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Abstract

We analyze a regime change game in which an active defender can invest in costly, unobservable defenses. We show that if there are sufficiently many potential attackers, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which the defender chooses to have almost no defenses and attacks almost never occur. This provides a new perspective on coordination problems and the necessity of refinements in regime change games. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Jann, Ole UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-6198-3819 UNSPECIFIED Schottmüller, Christoph UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-6059-1090 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-585547
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.008
Journal or Publication Title:	Games Econ. Behav.
Volume:	129
Page Range:	S. 96 - 114
Date:	2021
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Place of Publication:	SAN DIEGO
ISSN:	1090-2473
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship for Microeconomics
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language GLOBAL GAMES; EQUILIBRIUM; INFORMATION; PROBABILITY; PREDICTIONS; SELECTION; SIZE Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/58554