Universität zu Köln

Fochmann, Martin ORCID: 0000-0002-7747-1105, Fochmann, Nadja, Kocher, Martin G. and Mueller, Nadja (2021). Dishonesty and risk-taking: Compliance decisions of individuals and groups. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 185. S. 250 - 287. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Unethical behavior in organizations is usually associated with the risk of negative consequences for the organization and for the involved managers if being detected. The existing experimental literature in economics has so far focused mainly on the analysis of unethical behavior in environments that involve no fines or similar monetary consequences. In the current paper, we use a tax compliance framework to study (un-)ethical behavior of individuals and small groups. Our results show that groups are clearly less compliant than individuals. The risk of being detected is the most important aspect in the group communication process when deciding on compliance. (c) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ )

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Fochmann, Martin UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-7747-1105 UNSPECIFIED Fochmann, Nadja UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Kocher, Martin G. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Mueller, Nadja UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-591690
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2021.02.018
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
Volume:	185
Page Range:	S. 250 - 287
Date:	2021
Publisher:	ELSEVIER
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1879-1751
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language TAX COMPLIANCE; 2 HEADS; TEAM; PREFERENCES; RESPONSIBILITY; BEHAVIOR; TRUTH; AVERSION; GAME Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/59169