Siscoe, Robert Weston (2022). Credal accuracy and knowledge. Synthese, 200 (2). DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

Traditional epistemologists assumed that the most important doxastic norms were rational requirements on belief. This orthodoxy has recently been challenged by the work of revolutionary epistemologists on the rational requirements on credences. Revolutionary epistemology takes it that such contemporary work is important precisely because traditional epistemologists are mistaken-credal norms are more fundamental than, and determinative of, belief norms. To make sense of their innovative project, many revolutionary epistemologists have also adopted another commitment, that norms on credences are governed by a fundamental accuracy norm. Unfortunately for the revolutionary epistemologist, it has been difficult to define a measure of accuracy while maintaining that credal norms are more basic than belief norms. In this paper, I criticize one such proposal for measuring accuracy, that the accuracy of our credences should be assessed in terms of what we know, arguing that this picture ultimately cannot vindicate the revolutionary approach.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Siscoe, Robert WestonUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-657601
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03636-8
Journal or Publication Title: Synthese
Volume: 200
Number: 2
Date: 2022
Publisher: SPRINGER
Place of Publication: DORDRECHT
ISSN: 1573-0964
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
BELIEFMultiple languages
History & Philosophy Of Science; PhilosophyMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/65760

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