Universität zu Köln

Bortolotti, Stefania, Koelle, Felix and Wenner, Lukas (2022). On the persistence of dishonesty. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 200. S. 1053 - 1066. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

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Abstract

In social and economic interactions, individuals often exploit informational asymmetries and behave dishonestly to pursue private ends. In many of these situations, the costs and benefits from dishonest behavior do not accrue immediately and at the same time. In this paper, we experimentally investigate the role of time on dishonesty. Contrary to our pre-dictions, we find that neither delaying the gains from cheating nor increasing temporal engagement with one's own unethical behavior reduces the likelihood of cheating. Further-more, providing individuals with an excuse to lie by inserting a delay between the time when private information is obtained and when it is reported does not affect cheating. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Bortolotti, Stefania UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Koelle, Felix UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Wenner, Lukas UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-672904
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2022.07.007
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
Volume:	200
Page Range:	S. 1053 - 1066
Date:	2022
Publisher:	ELSEVIER
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1879-1751
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language TIME; PUNISHMENT; BEHAVIOR; AVERSION; LIES Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/67290