Fugger, Nicolas ORCID: 0000-0002-1730-8509, Gretschko, Vitali ORCID: 0000-0002-2729-3814 and Pollrich, Martin (2022). Information design in sequential procurement. Games Econ. Behav., 135. S. 79 - 86. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We analyze the problem of a buyer who chooses a supplier for a two-period production project. The buyer lacks the commitment not to renegotiate the contractual terms in the second period. The prospect of renegotiation makes suppliers cautious about the information revealed in period one. We derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism and highlight the role of information design for its implementation. We show that the buyer can achieve the full commitment surplus with the appropriate information design even without commitment. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||||||||||
Creators: |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-679106 | ||||||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.013 | ||||||||||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Games Econ. Behav. | ||||||||||||||||
Volume: | 135 | ||||||||||||||||
Page Range: | S. 79 - 86 | ||||||||||||||||
Date: | 2022 | ||||||||||||||||
Publisher: | ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE | ||||||||||||||||
Place of Publication: | SAN DIEGO | ||||||||||||||||
ISSN: | 1090-2473 | ||||||||||||||||
Language: | English | ||||||||||||||||
Faculty: | Unspecified | ||||||||||||||||
Divisions: | Unspecified | ||||||||||||||||
Subjects: | no entry | ||||||||||||||||
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URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/67910 |
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