Fugger, Nicolas ORCID: 0000-0002-1730-8509, Gretschko, Vitali ORCID: 0000-0002-2729-3814 and Pollrich, Martin (2022). Information design in sequential procurement. Games Econ. Behav., 135. S. 79 - 86. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

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Abstract

We analyze the problem of a buyer who chooses a supplier for a two-period production project. The buyer lacks the commitment not to renegotiate the contractual terms in the second period. The prospect of renegotiation makes suppliers cautious about the information revealed in period one. We derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism and highlight the role of information design for its implementation. We show that the buyer can achieve the full commitment surplus with the appropriate information design even without commitment. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Fugger, NicolasUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-1730-8509UNSPECIFIED
Gretschko, VitaliUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-2729-3814UNSPECIFIED
Pollrich, MartinUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-679106
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.013
Journal or Publication Title: Games Econ. Behav.
Volume: 135
Page Range: S. 79 - 86
Date: 2022
Publisher: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Place of Publication: SAN DIEGO
ISSN: 1090-2473
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
AUCTION DESIGNMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/67910

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