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Number of items: 8.

Journal Article

Fugger, Nicolas ORCID: 0000-0002-1730-8509, Gretschko, Vitali ORCID: 0000-0002-2729-3814 and Pollrich, Martin (2022). Information design in sequential procurement. Games Econ. Behav., 135. S. 79 - 86. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

Gretschko, Vitali and Ockenfels, Axel ORCID: 0000-0003-1456-0191 (2023). Empfehlungen für das Marktdesign zur Befüllung der Gasspeicher. Wirtschaftsdienst, 103 (2). pp. 105-111. ZBW. ISSN 1613-978X

Gretschko, Vitali and Rajko, Alexander (2015). Excess information acquisition in auctions. Exp. Econ., 18 (3). S. 335 - 356. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-6938

Gretschko, Vitali, Rasch, Alexander and Wambach, Achim (2014). On the strictly descending multi-unit auction. J. Math. Econ., 50. S. 79 - 86. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0304-4068

Gretschko, Vitali and Wambach, Achim (2014). Information acquisition during a descending auction. Econ. Theory, 55 (3). S. 731 - 752. NEW YORK: SPRINGER. ISSN 1432-0479

Mass, Helene, Fugger, Nicolas, Gretschko, Vitali and Wambach, Achim (2020). Imitation Perfection-A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurements. Am. Econ. J.-Microecon., 12 (3). S. 189 - 246. NASHVILLE: AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. ISSN 1945-7685

Riehm, Tobias, Fugger, Nicolas, Gillen, Philippe, Gretschko, Vitali and Werner, Peter (2022). Social norms, sanctions, and conditional entry in markets with externalities: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment. J. Public Econ., 212. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0047-2727

Thesis

Gretschko, Vitali (2012). The failure of the revenue equivalence principle: multiple objects, information acquisition and favoritism. PhD thesis, Universität zu Köln.

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