Universität zu Köln

Boone, Jan ORCID: 0000-0002-0958-2444 and Schottmuüler, Christoph ORCID: 0000-0001-6059-1090 (2019). Do Health insures contract the best providers? Provider, Networks, Quality and Costs. Int. Econ. Rev., 60 (3). S. 1209 - 1248. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1468-2354

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

We provide a modeling framework to analyze selective contracting in the health-care sector. Two health-care providers differ in quality and costs. When buying health insurance, consumers observe neither provider quality nor costs. We derive an equilibrium where health insurers signal provider quality through their choice of provider network. Selective contracting focuses on low-cost providers. Contracting both providers signals high quality. Market power reduces the scope for signaling, thereby leading to lower quality and inefficiency.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Boone, Jan UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-0958-2444 UNSPECIFIED Schottmuüler, Christoph UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-6059-1090 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-145472
DOI:	10.1111/iere.12383
Journal or Publication Title:	Int. Econ. Rev.
Volume:	60
Number:	3
Page Range:	S. 1209 - 1248
Date:	2019
Publisher:	WILEY
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	1468-2354
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship for Microeconomics
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language MANAGED CARE; INSURANCE; COMPETITION; EQUILIBRIUM; INCENTIVES; MARKETS; DEMAND; PLANS Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/14547