Universität zu Köln

Rockenbach, Bettina ORCID: 0000-0003-2624-1964, Schneiders, Sebastian and Waligora, Marcin ORCID: 0000-0001-7458-1758 (2018). Pushing the bad away: reverse Tullock contests. J. Econ. Sci. Assoc.-JESA, 4 (1). S. 73 - 86. NEW YORK: SPRINGER. ISSN 2199-6784

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Abstract

The literature on rent-seeking primarily focuses on contests for achieving gains, although contests for avoiding losses are also omnipresent. Examples for such 'reverse' contests are activities to prevent the close-down of a local school or the construction of a waste disposal close-by. While under standard preferences, investments in 'reverse' and 'conventional' contests should not be different, loss aversion predicts contests for avoiding losses to be fiercer than conventional ones. In our experimental data, the difference in investments between conventional and reverse Tullock contests is small and statistically insignificant. We discuss several explanations for this remarkable finding.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Rockenbach, Bettina UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-2624-1964 UNSPECIFIED Schneiders, Sebastian UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Waligora, Marcin UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-7458-1758 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-181871
DOI:	10.1007/s40881-018-0052-7
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Sci. Assoc.-JESA
Volume:	4
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 73 - 86
Date:	2018
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	NEW YORK
ISSN:	2199-6784
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship for Experimental and Behavioral Economics Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Reinhard Selten Institute
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PROSPECT-THEORY; RENT-SEEKING; EQUILIBRIUM; AUCTIONS Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/18187