Kajackaite, Agne and Sliwka, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165 (2017). Social responsibility and incentives in the lab: Why do agents exert more effort when principals donate? J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 142. S. 482 - 494. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1879-1751
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We test experimentally whether and why principals' charitable giving affects agents' efforts. We study a simple principal-agent setting in the lab, where a principal decides whether to donate a fixed amount to a charity and, in the next step, an agent chooses his effort. We argue there are three potential mechanisms that can trigger a higher effort after a donation in this setting: distributional concerns, reciprocal altruism, and shared warm glow utility. We find agents choose higher efforts when principals donate. With respect to the mechanisms, we find evidence for reciprocal altruism and distributional concerns as drivers of agents' performance reactions in the lab. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||||||
Creators: |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-215637 | ||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.08.013 | ||||||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | J. Econ. Behav. Organ. | ||||||||||||
Volume: | 142 | ||||||||||||
Page Range: | S. 482 - 494 | ||||||||||||
Date: | 2017 | ||||||||||||
Publisher: | ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV | ||||||||||||
Place of Publication: | AMSTERDAM | ||||||||||||
ISSN: | 1879-1751 | ||||||||||||
Language: | English | ||||||||||||
Faculty: | Unspecified | ||||||||||||
Divisions: | Unspecified | ||||||||||||
Subjects: | no entry | ||||||||||||
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Refereed: | Yes | ||||||||||||
URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/21563 |
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