Universität zu Köln

Kajackaite, Agne and Sliwka, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165 (2017). Social responsibility and incentives in the lab: Why do agents exert more effort when principals donate? J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 142. S. 482 - 494. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1879-1751

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Abstract

We test experimentally whether and why principals' charitable giving affects agents' efforts. We study a simple principal-agent setting in the lab, where a principal decides whether to donate a fixed amount to a charity and, in the next step, an agent chooses his effort. We argue there are three potential mechanisms that can trigger a higher effort after a donation in this setting: distributional concerns, reciprocal altruism, and shared warm glow utility. We find agents choose higher efforts when principals donate. With respect to the mechanisms, we find evidence for reciprocal altruism and distributional concerns as drivers of agents' performance reactions in the lab. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Kajackaite, Agne UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Sliwka, Dirk UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-8026-0165 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-215637
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2017.08.013
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
Volume:	142
Page Range:	S. 482 - 494
Date:	2017
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1879-1751
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language IMPURE ALTRUISM; WARM-GLOW; PREFERENCES; COMPETITION; FAIRNESS; OUTCOMES Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/21563