Universität zu Köln

Gillen, Philippe, Rasch, Alexander, Wambach, Achim and Werner, Peter (2016). Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation. Theory Decis., 81 (4). S. 511 - 535. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-7187

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Abstract

In this article we experimentally investigate reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions in which bidders compete to sell their single unit to a buyer who wants to purchase several objects. Our study yields three insights: (i) bids are substantially higher than Nash equilibrium bids predicted by standard economic theory; (ii) these higher-than-predicted prices gradually decline in later periods; and (iii) bid pooling (or simultaneous bidding) is frequently observed-the majority of bidders submit their bids immediately after the first bidder has sold his unit. A model that distinguishes between myopic and sophisticated bidding strategies helps to organize these patterns both on the aggregate and on the individual level.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Gillen, Philippe UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Rasch, Alexander UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Wambach, Achim UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Werner, Peter UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-258000
DOI:	10.1007/s11238-016-9546-z
Journal or Publication Title:	Theory Decis.
Volume:	81
Number:	4
Page Range:	S. 511 - 535
Date:	2016
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	DORDRECHT
ISSN:	1573-7187
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language 1ST-PRICE AUCTIONS; PRICE-COMPETITION; WINNERS CURSE; COLLUSION; BEHAVIOR; MODEL; OLIGOPOLY; BELIEFS; GAMES Multiple languages Economics; Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/25800