Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2015). Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions. J. Public Econ., 132. S. 23 - 32. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0047-2727
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. Who should be the owner of the public project? In an incomplete contracting model in which ex post negotiations are without frictions, the party that values the public good most should be the owner, regardless of technological aspects. However, under the plausible assumption that there are bargaining frictions, the optimal ownership structure depends on technological aspects and on the parties' valuations. We-show that the differences between incomplete contracting models with public goods and private goods are thus smaller than has previously been thought. (C) 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||
Creators: |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-385175 | ||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.09.009 | ||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | J. Public Econ. | ||||||||
Volume: | 132 | ||||||||
Page Range: | S. 23 - 32 | ||||||||
Date: | 2015 | ||||||||
Publisher: | ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA | ||||||||
Place of Publication: | LAUSANNE | ||||||||
ISSN: | 0047-2727 | ||||||||
Language: | English | ||||||||
Faculty: | Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences | ||||||||
Divisions: | Center of Excellence C-SEB | ||||||||
Subjects: | Economics | ||||||||
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
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Refereed: | Yes | ||||||||
URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/38517 |
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