Universität zu Köln

Huck, Steffen, Szech, Nora and Wenner, Lukas M. ORCID: 0000-0002-5649-6354 (2025). More effort with less pay: On information avoidance, optimistic beliefs, and performance. European Economic Review, 174. pp. 1-17. Elsevier. ISSN 0014-2921

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Abstract

[Artikel-Nr. 104965] Neoclassical theory presumes that agents value instrumental information. In contrast, recent behavioral studies motivate and model information avoidance. We study preferences for and against instrumental information in a real-effort task varying information structures on performance pay. Our study offers three main results. First, we confirm that both, preferences for and against instrumental information, exist. Second, information avoiders outperform information receivers. This result holds independently of effects of self-selection. Third, our findings about information avoiders can be aligned with behavioral theories of optimistic belief design.

Item Type:	Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Huck, Steffen UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Szech, Nora UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Wenner, Lukas M. UNSPECIFIED https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5649-6354 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-794334
Identification Number:	10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104965
Journal or Publication Title:	European Economic Review
Volume:	174
Page Range:	pp. 1-17
Number of Pages:	1
Date:	May 2025
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0014-2921
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Weitere Institute, Arbeits- und Forschungsgruppen > Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar
Subjects:	Economics
['eprint_fieldname_oa_funders' not defined]:	Publikationsfonds UzK
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/79433