Universität zu Köln

Rockenbach, Bettina ORCID: 0000-0003-2624-1964 and Wolff, Irenaeus (2019). The Dose Does it: Punishment and Cooperation in Dynamic Public-Good Games. Rev. Behav. Econ., 6 (1). S. 19 - 38. HANOVER: NOW PUBLISHERS INC. ISSN 2326-6201

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Abstract

We experimentally study the role of punishment for cooperation in dynamic public-good problems where past payoffs determine present contribution capabilities. The beneficial role of punishment possibilities for cooperation is fragile: successful cooperation hinges on the presence of a common understanding of how punishment should be used. If high-contributors punish too readily, the group likely gets on a wasteful path of punishment and retaliation. If punishment is administered more patiently, even initially uncooperative groups thrive. Hence, when today's punishment also determines tomorrow's cooperation abilities, it seems crucial that groups agree on the right 'dose' of sanctions for punishment to support cooperation.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Rockenbach, Bettina UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-2624-1964 UNSPECIFIED Wolff, Irenaeus UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-139660
DOI:	10.1561/105.00000084
Journal or Publication Title:	Rev. Behav. Econ.
Volume:	6
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 19 - 38
Date:	2019
Publisher:	NOW PUBLISHERS INC
Place of Publication:	HANOVER
ISSN:	2326-6201
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship for Experimental and Behavioral Economics Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Reinhard Selten Institute
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language ENFORCEMENT; RECIPROCITY; INEQUALITY; GROWTH; NORMS Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/13966